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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues of law are reviewed under a correctness standard, without deference to
the trial court. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 8, 1999, the legislative body of Salt Lake City enacted
Ordinance No. 40 of 1999, later embodied in the Salt Lake City Code as 12.12.090,
hereinafter referred to as the "Cruising ordinance." A complete copy of the Cruising
ordinance is included in the Addendum to this brief. The Cruising ordinance defines
"cruising" as "the driving of a motor vehicle more than two times between the hours
of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., in a particular direction, past a traffic control point." Salt
Lake City Code 12.12.090 §B.) The effective date of the ordinance was June 15, 1999.
Prior to enforcement, signs were posted at regular intervals along the no
cruising route. (Eight signs between South Temple and 2100 South for both
northbound and southbound traffic on State Street.) Each sign defines the area in
bright red as a "No Cruising Zone" and specifically defines the offense: "Traffic
Congested Area / No Cruising Zone / No Vehicle May Pass a Control Point in a
2
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Particular Direction More Than 2 Times Between the Hours of 11 PM - 4 AM." A
public information campaign, including passing out approximately 2,000 flyers to
"cruisers," preceded enforcement. Media coverage of the ordinance enactment and
planned enforcement was extensive. In addition to newspaper and radio coverage,
local television news programs aired 55 spots about the ordinance between June 7,
1999, and July 2, 1999 (the day before enforcement began). Reply to Defendant's
"Response to Plaintiff's Court Arguments and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities" at 12, footnote 5.
On or about July 9, 1999, Appellant received a citation for violating the
Cruising ordinance. Between September 3, 1999, and January 10, 2000, various
memoranda were filed by Appellant and the prosecution, and oral argument was held
on several dates. On January 10 the trial court issued its ruling, upholding the
constitutionality of the Cruising ordinance, in the form of a Minute Entry and Order.
Appellant stipulated that he had in fact committed the elements of the offense, was
convicted of the offense of violating the Cruising ordinance, and this appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS NOT FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Appellant has not fulfilled the requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure concerning transcripts of trial court proceedings. No transcript was ever
3
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provided to Appellee. As far as Appellee is aware, no certificate was ever filed to
indicate that there would be no further request for transcripts. Since the record does
not include a transcript to provide evidentiary support, Appellant has failed to marshal
his evidence sufficiently to merit appellate review.
II.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED

The Brief of Appellant consists of the same broad, hyperbolic assertions found
in Appellant's memoranda at the trial court level. For the most part, Appellant's brief
consists of declarations of the broadest possible nature concerning his political beliefs
and his own interpretations of the place of federal and state constitutions in American
law. No authority or legal analysis has been provided. Due to the inadequacy of the
Appellant's briefing, the issues before the court are too broad and too vague to merit
further review or oral argument.
III.

THE CRUISING ORDINANCE WAS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SALT LAKE CITY'S
POLICE POWERS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW

Salt Lake City has been legislatively granted police powers to enact ordinances
in the interests of public health, safety and welfare. Prior to the enactment of Salt Lake
City Code 12.12.090, the City Council conducted a public hearing and made certain
legislative findings. Those findings reveal the serious problems that have been linked
to the practice of cruising in Salt Lake City. The City Council found that elimination
of cruising between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. would result in an
4
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elimination of many of the safety problems and much, if not all, of the traffic
congestion, noise, and "road rage," during those hours. The exercise of police powers
by the City's legislative body to address the concerns of public health, safety, and
welfare were consistent with the general grant of power contained in the enabling
statutes of the Utah Code.
IV.

APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY

Under state law and under the Salt Lake City Code, an infraction carries no
possibility of incarceration. Appellant's request for a jury trial, therefore, was contrary
to established law. Even if, arguendo, a jury was appropriate for an infraction-level
offense, a panel of jurors cannot determine an issue of constitutional law. Since
Appellant admitted culpability of the factual elements of the offense, all that remained
were legal issues which would have been decided by the trial judge even if a jury had
been impaneled.
V.

SALT LAKE CITY'S CRUISING ORDINANCE MEETS ALL CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS

A presumption of constitutionality applies to the decisions of legislative bodies.
One challenging a municipal ordinance has the burden to overcome the presumption
of validity and constitutionality. Appellant has provided little or no analysis in his
brief, let alone an analysis that meets this burden. His reference to the Tenth
Amendment is misplaced, as that amendment is a restriction on federal power. His
5
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reference to freedom of expression is completely unsubstantiated. To show that
conduct is expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment, there must be
an evidenced intent to convey a particularized message through the conduct and a
substantial likelihood that the intended message would be understood by those who
viewed it. Appellant has shown neither of these elements.
With regard to Appellant's assertions as to the free exercise of religion, "while
the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question
whether it is 'truly held.'" United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,185 (1965). The bald
assertions in the Brief of Appellant that cruising could be religious to someone is not
sufficient to merit appellate review. Similarly, Appellant has not met his burden in
asserting a violation of the Equal Protection clauses. Even if, arguendo, we assume
that the Cruising ordinance creates a classification of "people who cruise," this does
not mean that the classification is unconstitutional. No suspect or quasi-suspect
classification of persons is involved here. Furthermore, the record contains no
evidence indicating that the Cruising ordinance is not rationally based.
Appellant claims that the Cruising ordinance violates unenumerated rights of
the United States Constitution. As the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals and
other appellate courts have found, however, even if a right of intrastate travel exists,
that right is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Salt Lake

6
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City's Cruising ordinance is a narrowly tailored ordinance that satisfies all
constitutional concerns.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS NOT FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

First, Appellee renews its objection (first tendered in Appellee's Motion for
Summary Disposition) to the untimely filing of the docketing statement in this matter.
Pursuant to Rule 9(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the docketing
statement was due February 28, 2000, 21 days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Defendant/Appellant Kenneth R. Larsen (hereinafter, "Appellant") failed to file said
docketing statement until March 16, 2000, 18 days past the due date. Appellant's only
excuse for this delay was "inexperience." Response to Appellee's Motion for
Summary Disposition and Supporting Memorandum at 1. From the earliest
proceedings in this matter, Appellant (and, for a time, his attorney) have expected
either the trial court or the prosecution to assist, excuse, or explain one aspect or
another of trial and motion practice. The on-site training of legal hobbyists is not and
should not be the job of the courts or any other component of the judicial system.
Appellant's expectations throughout this case have been unfair both to the
practitioners in that system and to the citizens of Utah and Salt Lake City.

7
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Second, Appellant has not fulfilled the requirements of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure concerning transcripts of trial court proceedings.
Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing
the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court
executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already
on file as the appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in
writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of
an appeal. ... If no such parts of the proceedings are to be
requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy
with the clerk of the appellate court.
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(1). Appellant purportedly filed a Request for Transcript
on February 17, 2000. That Request sought only a transcript of proceedings on
January 10, 2000, on which date no argument was presented. In any event, no
transcript was ever provided to Appellee. As far as Appellee is aware, no certificate
was ever filed to indicate that there would be no further request for transcript. A
transcript of all proceedings in this matter is required for this Court to have a full
sense of the nature of Appellant's arguments, and the extraordinary efforts extended
by the trial court and the prosecution to address Appellant's rambling, unfocused, and
unsupported assertions.
Although the arguments in the Brief of Appellant are constitutional challenges,
several of his challenges require a factual foundation.
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding
or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of
all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the
court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
Id., 11(e)(2). Appellant is urging that the trial court's conclusion of constitutionality is
contrary to the evidence. Without any supporting evidence in the record, Appellant has
made bald assertions that cruising is a constitutionally protected form of expression
and a religious exercise. Brief of Appellant and Defendant (hereinafter "Br. of
Appellant") at 17-21. Bald assertions are not evidence.
No evidentiary record has been provided to support either of these propositions.
There is no record to indicate that cruising, let alone cruising at the specific times,
places, and manner prohibited by Salt Lake City Code 12.12.090, has been used by
any individual to convey a particularized message. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989). There is no record to indicate that cruising as prohibited by Salt Lake
City ordinance is a religious exercise for any individual. See, e.g., United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,185-86, 85 S.Ct. 850, 864 (1965). Since no transcript has been
provided as evidentiary support, Appellant has failed to marshal his evidence
sufficiently to merit appellate review. See, e.g., State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, \A\,
370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11.

9
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II.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED

Appellant has not provided a transcript of any court proceedings in this matter.
Therefore the record on appeal is limited to the "original papers and exhibits filed in
the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 11(a).
As anticipated in Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, the Brief of
Appellant consists of the same broad, hyperbolic assertions found in Appellant's
memoranda at the trial court level. Those memoranda included the "Response to
Plaintiff's Court Arguments and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities"
(hereinafter "Appellant's Response"), the "Defendant's Memorandum and Points of
Authority" (hereinafter "Appellant's Memorandum"), and the "Addendum to
Defendant's Memorandum and Points of Authority." In responsive memoranda and in
court proceedings, Appellee argued repeatedly that Appellant's arguments were
inadequately briefed, and moved the trial court to strike Appellant's motion on that
basis. The trial court denied these requests. See, e.g., Minute Entry and Order at 1.
Therefore Appellee has borne the responsibility for both developing and opposing
Appellant's arguments.
Appellant evidently expects to continue this approach in his appeal. Points I
through IV of his brief are simply declarations, of the broadest possible nature, of
Appellant's political beliefs and his own interpretations of the place of federal and
state constitutions in American law. Even these broad declarations are not associated
10
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in any specific way to Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance. For instance, in point IV
of his brief, Appellant states that he "intends to demonstrate" that the infraction
Cruising offense is "similarly oppressive and unconstitutional" to a hypothetical law
making Judaism a capital offense. Br. of Appellant at 11. No authority or legal
analysis is ever provided, however, even when Appellant returns to the subject of
constitutionality in his points VII and VIII. Again, Appellant expects his opinions to
be sufficient.
The argument [section of an appellate brief] shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
With the exceptions of points VI and VIIID. 1., the only authorities cited in the
Brief of Appellant are the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.
Point VI refers almost exclusively to archaic law while ignoring ruling precedents. Br.
of Appellant at 13-15. Point VIII, subsection D. 1., cites one recent United States
Supreme Court decision but provides no analysis to put the quotations in context or
link it to the ordinance at issue. Id. at 22. The rest of point VIII is limited to the same
kind of broad, unsubstantiated claims of unconstitutionality that were set forth in
Appellant's memoranda at the trial level. For example, in section A of Appellant's
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point VIII, Appellant seeks First Amendment protection for cruising with the
following two paragraphs:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech," (US [sic] Constitution, Amendment I) "All men have
the inherent and inalienable right... to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions," (Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1)
and "No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press." (Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 15)
Cruising is a way of announcing one's arrival. It is more than
just driving a car down a street. It is about being seen by one's
peers and meeting new friends. It is a cultural gathering,
sprinkled with a bit of youthful and (hopefully) healthy rebellion.
Appellant asserts that Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance
restricts free speech.
Id. at 17. This is the whole of Appellant's analysis urging this Court to apply the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution in an unusual and unprecedented
manner.
Appellee and this Court are evidently expected not only to do Appellant's
research, but also to form his broad declarations into a pertinent legal analysis. Such
expectations are not permissible. "It is well settled that a reviewing court will not
address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52,
^[18, 975 P.2d 939, 944. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified this
principle, as seen in these remarks:
We have made clear that this court is not "'a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)
(quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 416 N.E.2d
12
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783, 784, 48 111. Dec. 510 (111. 1981)). We further clarified the
requirements of rule 24(a)(9) in the recent case of State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998), where we stated that rule
24(a)(9) "implicitly ... requires not just bald citation to authority
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority." Id. at 305.
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,131, 973 P.2d 404, 410. See also, Burns v. Summerhays,
927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and State ex rel C.Yv. Yates, 834 P.2d 69 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
In Jaeger, the appellant cited "relevant constitutional provisions" and case law,
but "his brief otherwise lacked any meaningful analysis of this authority." Id. The
Court therefore declined to consider his constitutional arguments. As to Appellant's
points in the present case, however, the Brief of Appellant more closely parallels the
situation in Jacoby, where (as to one issue) the "brief contained] no legal analysis or
authority..." Jacoby at ^[18 (emphasis added).
Due to the inadequacy of the Appellant's briefing, the issues before the court
are too broad and too vague to merit further review or oral argument.

III.

T H E CRUISING ORDINANCE WAS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SALT LAKE CITY'S
POLICE POWERS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW

Appellee will not respond individually to points I through IV of the Brief of
Appellant. Those sections do not actually raise or address any point at issue.
Collectively, these sections seem to aver that a law which is found to be
13
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unconstitutional under the Constitution of the United States should be stricken. In
point VII, Appellant appears to take that principle even further, suggesting that no law
is constitutional unless a constitutional provision expressly permits it. ("Appellant
asserts that the power to prohibit cruising ... has not been granted by any constitution
to the State of Utah or any of its political subdivisions." Br. of Appellant at 16.)
This brief is not the place to set forth a lesson on the hierarchical format of
American democracy and jurisprudence. However, the Cruising ordinance was
adopted in full compliance with state law. Salt Lake City has been legislatively
granted police powers to enact ordinances in the interests of public health, safety and
welfare. Those powers include the following:
They [municipalities] may pass all ordinances and rules, and
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for
carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties
conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to
provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort,
and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the city; ...
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (emphasis added).
They [municipalities] may regulate the movement of traffic on the
streets, sidewalks and public places, including the movement of
pedestrians as well as of vehicles, and the cars ... and may
prevent racing and immoderate driving or riding.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-30 (emphases added).
[Municipalities] ... may declare what shall be a nuisance, and
14
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abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who may create,
continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-60.
They [municipalities] may prohibit or regulate ... amusements or
practices having a tendency to annoy persons passing in the
streets or on sidewalks, ... or to interfere with traffic.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-69.
They [municipalities] ... may prevent the ringing of bells,
blowing of horns and bugles, crying of goods by auctioneers and
others, and the making of other noises, for the purpose of
business, amusement or otherwise, and prevent all performances
and devices tending to the collection ofpersons on the streets or
sidewalks of the city.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (emphases added).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that these grants
of police powers should be read liberally. Cities are to be given the widest latitude to
act in the public interest. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d. 1116 (Utah 1980);
Boulder Mountain Lodge Inc. v. Town of Boulder, 1999 UT 67, 983 P.2d 570.
Prior to the enactment of Salt Lake City ordinance 12.12.090, the City Council
conducted a public hearing and made certain legislative findings. Those findings,
which were subsequently incorporated in the ordinance {see Addendum, infra), reveal
the serious problems that have been linked to the practice of cruising in Salt Lake
City. Those problems include: homicides, fights, assaults, confrontations between
gang members, traffic congestion and gridlock, and excessive noise. The City Council
15
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found that elimination of cruising between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
would result in an elimination of many of the safety problems and much, if not all, of
the traffic congestion, noise, and "road rage," during those hours.
The exercise of police powers by the City's legislative body to address the
concerns of public health, safety, and welfare were absolutely consistent with the
general grant of power contained in Utah Code § 10-8-84 and the enabling statutes
cited above.

IV.

APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY

The violation of the Cruising ordinance was an infraction. Under state law, the
maximum penalty for an infraction is a $750.00 fine with no possibility of
incarceration (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-205 and 76-3-301 (l)(e)) and under the Salt
Lake City Code, a $500.00 maximum fine with no possibility of incarceration (Salt
Lake City Code § 1.12.050). The bail schedule for a violation of Salt Lake City
ordinance 12.12.090 was $117.00. Minute Entry and Order at 2. Appellant's request
for a jury trial—raised in points V and VI of the Brief of Appellant—was contrary to
established law and was properly denied.
It is well established that the right to a jury trial is triggered by
the type of punishment a defendant faces. See, e.g., Lewis v. U.S.,
518 U.S. 322, 135 L. Ed. 2d 590, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996)
(noting Supreme Court case law has established that when
defendant is charged with petty crime carrying maximum six
month prison term, Constitution does not guarantee right to jury
trial). Section 77-1-6 (2) (e) [of the Utah Code] reflects this
16
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general rule by providing for a jury trial except when a defendant
is charged with an infraction and therefore cannot possibly be
sentenced to prison.
West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Appellant has failed to provide an analysis of the cited state constitutional
provisions to show how they apply or why they would supercede federal law on this
issue. Br. of Appellant at 12. "'Because appellants failed to develop any meaningful
state constitutional argument below, our analysis must proceed solely under federal
constitutional law."' McDonald at 375, quoting State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also part II of this brief, "Appellant's Arguments are
Inadequately Briefed," supra.
Furthermore, it is clear that Appellant sought a jury not as an alternate trier of
fact, but in order to present arguments of constitutional law to the jury. At the trial
level, Appellant clarified this intention several times. In his "Stipulation of the Facts"
filed with the trial court on September 3, 1999, for instance, Appellant admitted
culpability as to the factual elements of the offense. He repeated those admissions in
Appellant's Response (point 5, §§A-D). Point 8, §A, of Appellant's Response
clarified this intention: "Although ordinary citizens may not understand all the details
regarding constitutionality and case law, Defendant is confident a majority of jurors
can and will easily see that the Salt Lake City Cruising ordinance is tyrannical,
overbroad, overbearing, unfair and just plain wrong." Appellant's Response, point 8,
17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§A. Further on, Appellant was even more explicit, expecting "...the People,
assembled injuries, to define and defend this right [of a constitutional freedom of
travel] ... ." Appellant's Response, point 8, §F. (Emphasis added.) And in his
brief before this Court, Appellant acknowledges again that he "has stipulated [to] the
facts and seeks to overturn a city ordinance on constitutional grounds." Br. of
Appellant at 13.
Even if, arguendo, a jury was appropriate for an infraction-level offense, a
panel of jurors cannot determine an issue of constitutional law. "In a jury trial,
questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact by the jury." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-10(1). Since Appellant admitted culpability of the factual elements
of the offense, all that remained were legal issues which would have been decided by
the trial judge even if a jury had been impaneled.
V.

THE CRUISING ORDINANCE MEETS SATISFIES ALL CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS

The Brief of Appellant does not provide sufficient constitutional analysis for
Appellee to respond with the specificity that would usually be appropriate before this
Court. {See part II of this brief, "Appellant's Arguments are Inadequately Briefed,"
supra.) Nevertheless, Appellant has cursorily raised the issue of constitutionality,
therefore the following response is provided in an attempt to assist the Court as much
as possible. Given the lack of analysis in the Brief of Appellant, however, the purpose
18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

here is not to canvass all possible issues that could stem from Appellant's broad
assertions, but rather to focus on those few colorable issues intimated in points VII
and VIII of his brief.1
A. Under the Principle Of Separation Of Powers, a Presumption of
Constitutionality Applies to the Decisions of Legislative Bodies
Municipal ordinances, like state statutes, are presumptively valid and
constitutional. Professor McQuillin, in his respected treatise on municipal
corporations, has stated:
No ordinance or law will be declared unconstitutional unless
clearly so, and every reasonable [effort] will be made to sustain
it. Not only must unconstitutionality appear clear, but, it has been
asserted, it must appear and be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
... If the constitutional questions raised are fairly debatable, the
court must declare the ordinance constitutional, as the court
cannot and must not substitute its judgment for that of the local
legislative body.
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 19.06 at 377-78 (3rd Ed. Rev.); see also,
Id. § 19.14. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this rule of construction.
It [a municipal ordinance] should not be held to be invalid unless

1

As in preceding parts of this brief, Appellee does not attempt to extend the
constitutional discussions to the state constitution. "'Because appellants failed to
develop any meaningful state constitutional argument below, our analysis must
proceed solely under federal constitutional law.'" West Valley City v. McDonald, 948
P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), quoting State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). (Emphasis added.)
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it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt2 to be incompatible with
some particular constitutional provision.
Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 915,
47 L.Ed.2d 766.
This rule is based on the separation of powers concept. The Utah Supreme
Court has observed:
Because of the seriousness of judicial responsibility and having
the final word in the inter-relationship with other departments
and institutions of government, it is found to be wise and proper
judicial policy to exercise its powers with restraint, and not to
intrude or interfere with discretionary functions or the policies of
other departments of government.
Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake City Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980).
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court ruled that it would only interfere with such
discretionary decisions if the City acted outside of its authority or if the City's actions
were "wholly discordant to reason and justice." Id.; Wright Development, Inc. v. City
ofWellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1980); State v. Taylor, 541 P.2d 1121, 1125
(Utah 1975); Mantua Town v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1978).
Therefore one challenging a municipal ordinance has the burden to overcome
the presumption of validity and constitutionality. Society of Separationists v.
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).
2

This was a criminal case and also illustrates that the determination of an
ordinance's validity is not altered by the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a
20
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A party mounting such a challenge bears a heavy burden
to overcome this presumption, and "'we resolve any
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality."' Dennis v.
Summit County, 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1997) (quoting
Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 920.)
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998). Appellant has provided little or no
analysis in his brief, let alone an analysis that meets this "heavy burden." Id.

B. The Tenth Amendment is Irrelevant in this Context
In point VII of Appellant's brief, Appellant claims that a presumption of
constitutionality is invalid pursuant to the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Defendant provides no case law and no substantive analysis. In any
event, the Tenth Amendment is a restriction on federal power, and therefore has no
relevance in the case at hand.
It should be pointed out, however, that state legislators (elected by the citizens
of Utah) created the enabling legislation that gives Salt Lake City its police powers.
See part III of this brief, supra. Furthermore, the people of Salt Lake City, through
their elected representatives, enacted the Cruising ordinance. Therefore the ordinance
is perfectly in line with the Tenth Amendment's reservation of unenumerated rights to
the states or the people.
For an additional discussion of the unenumerated rights of the federal
constitution, please refer to § F of this part, infra.
reasonable doubt.
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C. Cruising is Not a Protected Form of Expression
Point VIII, section A, of the Brief of Appellant claims that the practice of
cruising is a "Means of Communication" and is "more than just driving a car down a
street." Br. of Appellant at 17. From this, Appellant's conclusion is that the Cruising
ordinance "restricts free speech." Id.
The concept of free speech has undergone a metamorphosis in recent decades,
so that the Freedom of Speech clause now extends to some degree to conduct beyond
the written and spoken word. The clause is now commonly referred to as "Freedom of
Expression" rather than freedom of speech. To compensate for the expansion of the
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court developed a hierarchical approach in
matters of free expression. Expression of opinion in the printed form, as in books and
newspapers, retains its historically favored position in First Amendment
jurisprudence. This is particularly true for the expression of political opinion.. This sort
of expression of opinion is considered a core value of the First Amendment and is
known as "pure speech." On the other end of the spectrum from such "pure speech"
are those matters where speech is joined with conduct, often with the conduct being
the primary means of expression. These matters are generally referred to as "symbolic
speech" or "expressive speech." This sort of expression is at the other end of the
spectrum from "pure speech," receiving the least deference in free speech
considerations.
22
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To determine whether conduct is expressive, the Supreme Court has developed
a standard first stated in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), and amplified in
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Specifically, to be expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment, there must be an evidenced intent to convey a
particularized message in the conduct and a substantial likelihood that the intended
message would be understood by those who viewed it. This standard was easily
applied to Spence and Johnson, both flag desecration cases, given the nature of the
conduct and the context.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), 468 U.S. 288, 104
S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), concerned the rights of demonstrators who wanted
to camp in Lafayette Park in Washington, D.C., to call attention to the plight of the
homeless. In Clark, the Court considered whether or not actually sleeping in the tents
(the specific conduct at issue) was a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment. The Court made an important point for cases involving "expressive
conduct." In footnote 5 of the majority opinion, the Court stated,
Although it is common to place the burden upon the Government
to justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the
obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly
expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment
even applies. To hold otherwise would be to create a rule that all
conduct is presumptively expressive. In the absence of a showing
that such a rule is necessary to protect vital First Amendment
interests, we decline to deviate from the general rule that one
seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that he is
23
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entitled to it.
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3080 (footnote 5).
In his concurring opinion in Clark, Chief Justice Burger noted that while the
"expressive sleeping" or "expressive camping" involved in that case, given its context,
was a protected "statement," it "trivialized the First Amendment to seek to use it as a
shield in the manner asserted here." Id., 468 U.S. at 301, 104 S.Ct. at 3073. Clearly,
there must be a nexus between the conduct and a readily recognized message so that
the conduct becomes the medium for the message. Otherwise, the conduct is
meaningless.
Such is the case here. First, Appellant has made no showing that the First
Amendment applies to the kind of amorphous (that is, varying from individual to
individual) social communication as described in the Brief of Appellant. Actually, the
practice of cruising is highly analogous to the practice of recreational dancing. (Note
Appellant's description: "It is about being seen by one's peers and meeting new
friends. It is a cultural gathering, sprinkled with a bit of youthful and (hopefully)
healthy rebellion." Br. of Appellant at 17.) And as the Supreme Court observed in
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), there is no First Amendment protection
for recreational dancing. "It is possible to find some kernel of expression in
almost every activity a person undertakes ... but such a kernel is not sufficient to
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bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Stanglin, 490
U.S. at 25.
In any event, assuming, arguendo, that this practice rises to some de minimis
level of expressive conduct, all "[expression, whether oral or written or symbolized
by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions." Clark, 468
U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069. The restrictions embodied by the Cruising ordinance
are certainly reasonable, particularly when compared to the nature of the alleged
"communication."

D. The Cruising Ordinance Does Not Burden the Free Exercise of Religion
While the same could be said of Appellant's other arguments (and has been, in
part II of this brief), the claim that "Cruising is a Religious Exercise" (Br. of
Appellant at 18) is particularly unfounded. There is no evidence in the record to
substantiate that cruising is a religious practice for anyone, including Appellant
(further suggesting that the full record, including a complete transcript, should have
been provided in this matter).
"In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a
party must first raise the issue in the trial court," giving that court
an opportunity to rule on the issue. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). "A trial court has the
opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met:
(1) 'the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) 'the issue
must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must introduce
'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Id. (quoting
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct.
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App.) (citations and internal quotations omitted in original), cert,
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997)).
State v. McGuire, 1999 Utah App 45,16, 975 P.2d 476, 478 (emphasis added). Like
other unsupported, undeveloped arguments in the Brief of Appellant, the assertion that
cruising is a religious practice demands some modicum of supporting evidence. "[W]e
hasten to emphasize that while the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there
remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held.' This is the threshold
question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185,
85 S.Ct. at 863. The briefly asserted opinion in Appellant's trial-level memoranda that
cruising could be religious to someone was not sufficient to preserve this issue for
appellate review. As no transcript has been provided by Appellant, the record contains
no other evidence in this regard.
In any event, assuming, arguendo, that some people do "worship" (Br. of
Appellant at 19) automobiles, this does not mean that the Cruising ordinance is
unconstitutional.
[U]nder the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a
state law that incidentally burdens the exercise of religion is
not unconstitutional so long as the law is not intended to burden
free exercise, is of general applicability, and is otherwise valid.
See Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 879, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876,110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (stating
that Supreme Court decisions "have consistently held that the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
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conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)"' (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3, 71 L. Ed. 2d 127,
102 S.Ct. 1051(1982)).
Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1249. The Free Exercise clause "'embraces two concepts,—freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be."' United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886, 88
L.Ed. 1148 (1944) (quoting Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304,
60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213,128 A.L.R. 1352).
To some groups, dancing is religious ritual. This does not mean that any time,
place, or manner restriction on dancing is unconstitutional. If one blocks traffic by
dancing in the street (or even by praying in the street), it is safe to say that person
could lawfully be arrested or issued a citation. The Salt Lake City Council determined
that curbing recreational driving during certain hours was a necessary safety measure,
unrelated to any religious practices. The Automobile Worshippers are free to practice
their ritualistic driving throughout the day from 4:00 in the morning to 11:00 at night,
and 24 hours per day on the vast majority of City streets.
E. The Cruising Ordinance Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clauses
Appellant has made no showing to indicate how the Cruising ordinance could
be interpreted as creating classifications, let alone any showing of unlawful
application of the law to such classifications. The Cruising ordinance applies to
anyone traveling in a No Cruising Zone during specified hours, with limited
27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

exceptions. See, infra, §G of this part, subsection 3. In other words, all similarly
situated people are treated the same.
Even if, arguendo, we assume that the ordinance creates a classification of
"people who cruise," this does not mean that the classification is unconstitutional. No
suspect or quasi-suspect classification of persons is involved here.3 The Cruising
ordinance, as stated, applies to people of all races, genders, and ages—anyone who
violates the traffic regulation during the specified hours and specified places.
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
[Citations omitted.]
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993).
The record contains no evidence indicating that the Cruising ordinance is not,
at a minimum, rationally based. Against this lack of evidence are the findings of the
Salt Lake City Council which were the bases for enacting the ordinance. Appellant
admitted that those findings (which reveal a nexus between cruising and multiple

3

The United States Supreme Court has declined even to grant quasi-suspect status to
individuals who are mentally challenged, a classification the Court has described as
"large and amorphous." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445,
105 S.Ct. 3249, 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Obviously, that classification is far less
amorphous than "people who cruise," and far more likely to suffer from others'
prejudices.
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social problems) were accurate on each and every point (Appellant's Memorandum at
1-6), with the exception of the homicide statistics, which he "does not challenge" (Id.
at 3). Of course, in a federal equal protection analysis, the burden is not on the
government to defend the legislature's reasoning.
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to
sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. ... A statute is
presumed constitutional, ... and "[t]he burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it," Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35
L.Ed.2d 351 (1973)..., whether or not the basis has a foundation
in the record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis
review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there
is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does
not fail rational-basis review because it "'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S., at 485, 90
S.Ct., at 1161, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). "The
problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if
they do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be,
and unscientific." Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S.
61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441,443, 57 L.Ed. 730 (1913). [Additional
citations omitted.] ... We have applied rational-basis review in
previous cases involving the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Schweikerv. Wilson,
[450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981)]. In
neither case did we purport to apply a different standard of
rational-basis review from that just described.
Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993).
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F. The Cruising Ordinance Upholds All Constitutional Rights, Including
Unenumerated Rights
In point VIII, § D, of the Brief of Appellant, Appellant asserts that "Cruising is
an Unenumerated Right." He includes under that heading the claims that cruising "is
an exercise of the right to travel" and "a pursuit of happiness." Br. of Appellant at 2122. These assertions are so cursory and lack so completely anything resembling a legal
analysis, that Appellee is compelled to reiterate yet again its position of part II of this
brief: Appellant's arguments are not sufficiently briefed to merit a response.
That said, Appellee will attempt to bear the "burden of argument and research"
(Jaeger at ^31) as well as possible faced with such broad assertions. Given the
vagueness of Appellant's point VIII, it seems appropriate to proceed like the Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin did in interpreting a cruising ordinance similar to Salt Lake
City's. In Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. App. 1993), the
state appellate court found that the "common foundation" for multiple constitutional
challenges was really a "constitutional right to travel." Scheunemann at 166.
Those [challenges] include (1) the inherent and fundamental
liberty rights recognized in the Wisconsin Constitution ... (2) the
ninth amendment to the federal Constitution providing that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"; (3)
the tenth amendment...; and (4) the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
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Id, footnote 4. The issue of a right of intrastate travel seems to encompass the core of
Appellant's point VIII, as well as addressing the general concept of liberty broadly
asserted throughout the Brief of Appellant.
Appellant's sole reference to authority in his point VIII is to the United States
Supreme Court case, Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121 (decided June 10, 1999).
Therefore, that recent and widely publicized opinion will be addressed first, before
moving on to a more general analysis of the right to travel.
I. Chicago v. Morales Exemplifies the Strengths of the Cruising Ordinance
Chicago v. Morales only exemplifies the strengths of Salt Lake City's Cruising
ordinance. The main Morales opinion and its several concurring opinions can be
distilled into the Court's statement, "[T]he city [of Chicago] has enacted an ordinance
that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish
to use the public streets." Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121 (U.S. June 10, 1999;
Court opinion, paragraph one of section VI). Contrary to the Chicago ordinance at
issue in Morales, the Salt Lake City Cruising ordinance provides notice to citizens
with mechanical, numerical precision as to what conduct is prohibited, when, and
where. Unlike the "publicly undisclosed[ ] enforcement areas" (Id., first paragraph of
Morales opinion) of Chicago's anti-loitering ordinance, Salt Lake City's No Cruising
zones are clearly described, publicly disclosed, and posted. Of all criminal and traffic
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laws in the state of Utah, Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance probably provides the
most clear and conspicuous notice.
It is also the precision of the Cruising ordinance that limits the level of
discretion afforded to police. (See also § G of this part, subsection 3, infra.) With
specifically named exceptions and a specifically defined offense, police officers
enforcing the Cruising ordinance are left with almost no discretion. The average patrol
officer exercises more discretion in deciding whether a car cleared an intersection or
ran a red light. He or she exercises more discretion when deciding whether a group of
young men are engaging in good-natured shenanigans or unlawful disorderly conduct.
Under Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance, arbitrary enforcement is almost
impossible. With no disrespect intended, the police are essentially "bean counters" in
this role; three beans equals a citation.
Prosecutors and the courts are subject to the same limitations. There is no "net"
set up to "catch all possible offenders," leaving it for "the courts to step inside and
say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." Id., sixth
paragraph of section IV, Morales opinion, quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214, 221 (1876). An offender is an offender, based on the time, place, and manner of
his or her actions.
Appellant has carefully selected phrases from the Morales opinion that exhort
important, but extremely broad, references to the right to move about freely. These
32
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concepts will be addressed in the following section, in the context of other courts'
analyses of cruising ordinances. However, Appellee emphasizes in advance that one
person's right to move about "according to inclination" {Id., as quoted in Br. of
Appellant at 22) ends when that movement infringes on others' rights.
2. The Cruising Ordinance Does Not Unconstitutionally Burden, and In Fact
Protects, Any Constitutional Right of Intrastate Travel
Cities in many states, for over ten years now, have maintained ordinances
similar to Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in addressing the constitutionality of a York, Pennsylvania, cruising
ordinance similar to that of Salt Lake City, ruled that there is a fundamental right of
intrastate travel arising out of substantive due process. Based on that threshold
finding, the court ruled that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of
review, requiring that the ordinance be narrowly tailored to meet significant—but "not
necessarily compelling"—City objectives. Lutz v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 899
F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1990). By analogy to the jurisprudence of free speech in the
First Amendment context, the Lutz court held that certain time, place, and manner
restrictions could be placed on the right of intrastate travel.
The freedom of speech is expressly enumerated in the Bill of
Rights itself, and the [United States Supreme] Court, citing the
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression," [ ] often creates for it especially protective doctrines
that could be—but are not—applied to protected rights
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

generally.[ ] Nonetheless, the time, place and manner doctrine
allows certain restriction on speech to survive under less than
fully strict scrutiny. If the freedom of speech itself can be so
qualified, then surely the unenumerated right of localized travel
can be as well
Id. at 269 (emphasis added). This said, the Lutz court found that the York,
Pennsylvania, ordinance met the requirements of intermediate scrutiny:
We believe that the cruising ordinance passes muster as a
reasonable time, place and manner restriction on the right of
localized intrastate travel. York's interests in ensuring public
safety and reducing the significant congestion caused by cruising
are plainly significant. The ordinance is limited in its scope to
locations undisputedly affected by the current cruising problem,
and it leaves open ample alternative routes to get about town
without difficulty. It prohibits only certain repetitive driving
around the loop, and it prohibits no one from driving outside the
loop, or from driving to the loop and then walking anywhere
inside the loop—a distance no more than several blocks. Under
these circumstances, we conclude that the ordinance is narrowly
tailored to combating the safety and congestion problems
identified by the city.
Id. at 270.
Appellee proposes that the appropriate standard of review is a rational basis
test rather than intermediate scrutiny. In the absence of an issue of a fundamental right
or a suspect classification, Utah courts, like their federal counterparts, will apply the
rational basis test in determining whether the City's actions pass constitutional muster.
See, e.g., Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). That test
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determines whether there is a rational relationship between the purpose to be
accomplished and the means used to accomplish that purpose.
In the instant case, there is no fundamental right which is at stake. Although a
right to travel in interstate commerce has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court, (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22
L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)), that Court has not extended the right to intrastate travel. Also,
there is no suspect classification here. All persons without respect to race, age, gender,
disability, or other classification who come under the category of "cruising" are
subject to the ordinance.
Applying the rational basis test, there is clearly a rational relationship between
the goals of the ordinance (reducing crime, noise, congestion, pollution and other ills
created by the cruising activity) and the means of accomplishing those goals, namely
setting up a mechanism to prevent repeated driving along certain specified areas of the
city during certain hours of the night.
However, even if this Court agrees with the ruling of the Lutz court that there is
a fundamental right of intrastate travel and that the standard of intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate, Salt Lake City's ordinance, like the York, Pennsylvania ordinance upheld
in Lutz, easily meets that test. Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance actually covers a
time frame that is more narrow than that involved in Lutz: 11:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., as
opposed to 7:00 p.m. to 3:30 a.m. in York, Pennsylvania (an additional 3.5 hours). Salt
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Lake City's ordinance leaves open ample alternative routes to get about town without
difficulty. It prohibits only certain repetitive driving past a clearly identified control
point. It prohibits no one from driving on streets other than where the control point is
located or from driving to the control point and walking past the control point as many
times as desired. Under these circumstances, the City's ordinance is narrowly tailored
to address the safety, congestion, pollution, and other problems identified by the
City's legislative representatives.
Appellant has acknowledged the laundry list of cruising-related problems
identified by the City Council (Appellant's Memorandum at 1-6). In the Brief of
Appellant, he acknowledges that "[t]he US [sic] and Utah constitutions clearly protect
Appellant's right to cruise when not violating the equal rights of others." Br. of
Appellant at 23 (emphasis added). Appellant, however fails to put the two together, to
acknowledge that use of public roads at a certain time, place, and manner—namely
cruising the same stretch for recreational purposes in the middle of the night—does
violate the rights of others. That is what the City Council decided. Nevertheless,
Defendant ignores the fact that the freedom to travel extends equally to those "others."
The right to intrastate travel is a two-edged sword. The general populace
(outside those who use city streets for recreational cruising) also retain the right of
intrastate travel. For example, they have the right to get to the night shift at work on
time, to get home from the theater and go to bed, or to get to the all-night pharmacist
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when needed. They have a right to the benefit of others' right of travel as well, such as
receiving emergency assistance that is not unnecessarily delayed.
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, while interpreting another cruising
ordinance similar to Salt Lake City's, adopted this same perspective.
The city's cruising ordinance is not one which merely promotes a
self-serving interest of government at the expense of the
constitutional right of the people to freedom of movement.
Rather, the purpose of the ordinance is to create a safer and less
congested public street so that the general populace might more
easily travel the area in question. Viewed from this perspective, it
can be said that the ordinance enhances rather than restricts the
constitutional right to travel.
Scheunemann at 167 (emphasis in original). Several years later, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reviewed several other Wisconsin cities' cruising ordinances in
Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544 N.W.2d 894, 900 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin high court
adopted both the perspective and language of the Scheunemann court quoted above.
As the prosecution indicated at the trial level in this case, Appellant may have
pointed out the best reason for adopting a narrowly tailored cruising ordinance like
that of Salt Lake City: protecting the constitutional right to travel.
G. Appellant has Failed to Raise Additional Constitutional Arguments that
were Raised Superficially in His Trial-level Memoranda.
In its Minute Entry and Order, the trial court held as follows:
The Court agrees with plaintiff that defendant's Memoranda do
not generally provide either the precise bases for the Motion or
37

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the level of analysis usually expected, but sufficient relevant
constitutional challenges are raised in a comprehensible, albeit
[in a] very general and scattered manner, [so] that a resolution on
the merits of the challenge is appropriate.
Minute Entry and Order at 1. Among those "general and scattered" challenges, the
trial court found that Appellant "appealed] to raise the following issues, among
others: freedom of movement, overbreadth, vagueness, freedom of speech, fairness,
arbitrary enforcement and equal protection." Id. at 2. Issues of overbreadth,
vagueness, and arbitrary enforcement, however, are noticeably lacking in the Brief of
Appellant. Because there has been no analysis of these doctrines, this Court should not
consider them now. However, should this Court determine that a review of these
doctrines is appropriate, Appellee's analyses follow.

1. The Cruising Ordinance is Sufficiently Clear and Explicit to Inform the
Ordinary Person of Common Intelligence What Conduct is Prohibited.
The basic test of vagueness was spelled out by the Utah Supreme Court in State
v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987):
"Vagueness" goes to the issue of procedural due process, i.e.,
whether the statute is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the
ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is
prohibited.
Id. at 505. See also, State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1981).
The test for "vagueness" requires that a statute or ordinance defines an offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
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prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.4 Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).
See also, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1958, 75 L.Ed.2d
903 (1983).
It is obvious from an examination of Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance that it
satisfies this vagueness test. The ordinance very clearly and specifically sets forth
what conduct is prohibited. That is, that "no person shall drive or permit a motor
vehicle under his/her care, custody, or control to be driven in an area posted as a
traffic congested area past a Traffic Control Point in a particular direction more than
two times between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m." Salt Lake City Code
12.12.090 §C. The ordinance further requires that "every no cruising area shall be
posted with sufficient signs to provide notice of the prohibition," and that "signs shall
be of such size and shape, as the Transportation Engineer shall deem appropriate in
carrying out the Transportation Engineer's duties" in preparing such signs. Id. at §E.
Certainly the subject ordinance is sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the
ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is prohibited.
4

In one trial-level memorandum, Appellant asserted that the Cruising ordinance "is
unconstitutional because it is impossible to give adequate notice to visitors."
Defendant's Response, point 8, §E. This statement could be interpreted as a claim of
unconstitutional vagueness, although there is no requirement under constitutional or
statutory law that visitors to a city or state be individually informed of every law they
might encounter. However, as indicated in the Statement of Facts, supra, the public
was extensively and repeatedly informed about the ordinance.
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Interestingly, "vagueness" was the primary rationale used by one court to strike
a cruising ordinance. The opinion of State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. App.
1994), however, is a poor example of constitutional (or even logical) analysis, and can
be distinguished. The Stallman court adopts the "right of intrastate travel" analysis of
the federal Third Circuit's Lutz decision and its accompanying application of an
intermediate level of scrutiny. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision in
Scheunemann is also praised and its reasoning described as "particularly instructive."
Stallman at 906.
Nevertheless, rather than applying the same kind of well-defined analyses
found in Lutz and Scheunemann, the Stallman court drifts between an overbreadth and
vagueness analysis, and appears to be applying its own public policy preferences as
opposed to applying principles of constitutional law. Since the Stallman court claimed
to strike the Anoka, Minnesota ordinance as "unconstitutional on its face by reason of
vagueness," {Stallman at 910), the Stallman opinion will be discussed here.
Following its adoption of the Lutz standard of review, the Stallman court
summarized its vagueness/overbreadth hybrid as follows:
Even applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, this ordinance is
far from being narrowly and reasonably tailored. From the totality
of the record, it is far too sweeping, and allows unimpeded and
arbitrary decisionmaking by the police as to who to stop, and who
to cite or let go. This sweeping breadth is unnecessary to attack
Anoka's purported problem.
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Stallman at 907.
The Stallman court's concern over "arbitrary decisionmaking" presents the best
example of the poor logic in this decision, at least when contrasted with the court's
second great concern. That second concern is the fact that the Anoka ordinance lacked
an "excuse clause" like that in the ordinance upheld in Wisconsin in Scheunemann.
The Stallman court thinks so highly of the "excuse clause" that it adds emphasis to its
own text on the subject: "The [Wisconsin] ordinance also allowed the driver to give
an explanation that the driving was ...for a lawful purpose " Stallman at 907
(emphasis in original). The court repeats this point: "Most importantly, the West Bend
ordinance [of Scheunemann] allows drivers to offer a lawful explanation..." Id. at
908.
Strangely, the Stallman court fails to notice any conflict between the excuse
clause and the court's fear of "arbitrary decisionmaking by the police as to who ... to
cite or let go."5 Id. at 907. Nevertheless, the concept of an excuse provision cuts
directly against the Stallman court's own rationale for striking the Anoka's cruising
ordinance: vagueness. One of the primary functions of the vagueness doctrine is to
curb discretion afforded to police, which could result in unconstitutional applications
of the law.

5

For a discussion of the concern over arbitrary enforcement, see, infra, subsection 3
of this section and part.
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This is exactly what the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Brandmiller
(decided after Stallmari): "[T]he fact that the ordinances [of three Wisconsin cities]
lack an opportunity for an 'on the scene' explanation makes an officer's possible
abuse of discretion less likely." Brandmiller at 901. Like the Wisconsin ordinances in
Brandmiller, the Salt Lake City ordinance applies to everyone equally; officers are
afforded even less discretion than with other traffic regulations.
The next concern of the Stallman court is that the cruising-related problems
that inspired the Anoka ordinance are already defined as criminal violations. This
point was raised by Defendant in his responses to the "City Council Legislative
Findings of Fact." Defendant's Response, point 2. First, this argument ignores other
legitimate reasons for the Cruising ordinance, such as the traffic congestion that
results from the sheer number of cars. Second, it is ludicrous to suggest that laws
cannot be passed as preventive measures. Most traffic laws, in fact, are in place to
prevent more serious incidents and offenses from occurring, as well as to simply
coordinate the flow of traffic. If a traffic signal is placed at a busy intersection, we do
not say that there are already defined offenses for Improper Lookout, Negligent
Collision, right-of-way and stop sign violations, and "road rage" crimes.
Next, the Stallman court actually suggests that placing No Cruising signs
directly outside of fire and ambulance stations would be a more "narrow" application
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of the ordinance. The reality, of course, is that an ambulance that can leave its bay
unhampered still has to go up the street to get anywhere.
The Stallman court also suggests a concern that the ordinance could be used to
inappropriately target an "'undesirable' class of people, namely teenagers ... ."
Stallman at 908. Incredibly, the court states that the lack of an excuse clause would
add to this potential problem because an "undesirable" person would receive a ticket
no matter what excuse he or she presented. Again, the court seems to forget its own
concern about arbitrary enforcement.
Finally, three elements that caught the Stallman court's attention are factually
different than the Salt Lake City situation. First, the Anoka cruising prohibition
extended from 9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. Salt Lake City's prohibition avoids additional
work-related traffic with its 11-4 period. Second, judging by the examples given in
the Stallman opinion, the Anoka ordinance required three passes in either direction to
create a violation. (See Stallman at 909.) Salt Lake City's ordinance requires three or
more passes in the same direction. Finally, Anoka's signs stated only "No Cruising
9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m." Salt Lake City's signs define the offense with specifics. (See
Statement of Facts, supra, in this brief.)
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2. The Cruising Ordinance Satisfies Constitutional Overbreadth Concerns
Statutory language is overbroad if it proscribes both harmful and innocuous
behavior. Stated another way, a statute is overbroad if it attempts to sanction
constitutionally protected activities. Elks Lodges v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control 905 P.2d 1189, 1203 (Utah 1995), cert, denied, 517 U.S. 1221, 116 S.Ct.
1850, 134 L.Ed.2d 950 (1996); State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987).
In Lutz, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an overbreadth claim is
inapplicable outside the context of the First Amendment:
Nothing in the basic logic of the doctrine is specific to the
First Amendment. In principle, an argument could be made for
allowing facial challenges based on overbreadth to statutes that
reach any kind of protected activity. However, because striking
down a statute in its entirety, even if it has constitutional
applications, is such a strong remedy, the doctrine is a "narrow"
one generally disfavored. See New York State Club Association v.
City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2233, 101 L.Ed.2d
1 (1988). It is allowed in the First Amendment context only
because of "the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression," Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521,
92 S.Ct. at 1105, and has never been recognized outside the First
Amendment context. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

LutzztHl.
Because the appellant in Lutz had dropped its First Amendment claim, the court
did not reach that issue. Two Wisconsin courts, however, have found that ordinances
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similar Salt Lake City's were not unconstitutionally overbroad.6 In Scheunemann v.
Wisconsin, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Wis. App. 1993), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
considered an overbreadth challenge based in the First Amendment right of assembly.
The cruising ordinance in that case was "specifically limited ... to a designated daily
time span ('between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M.') and to a designated area
('Main Street between Paradise Drive and Washington Street')." Scheunemann at 166.
(Note the additional three hours of the time span when compared to the Salt Lake City
ordinance.) The Scheunemann court held as follows:
[T]his cruising ordinance carefully carves out, on both a spatial
and temporal basis, a narrow slice of driving conduct for
regulation. Given these limitations, we conclude that the city has
satisfactorily demonstrated that the cruising ordinance is not
unconstitutionally overbroad.
Id.
In Brandmiller, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered overbreadth
challenges of three cities' cruising ordinances. The time spans of those ordinances
were nearly double that of Salt Lake City's ordinance, running nine hours from 8:00
p.m. to 5:00 a.m. As previously mentioned, the Brandmiller court found that the lack
of an excuse clause actually supported the constitutionality of the ordinances.
... [T]he lack of an intent element and an opportunity to
6

The Minnesota Court of Appeals' overbreadth/vagueness/public policy decision of
State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. App. 1994), is discussed in subsection 1 of
this section and part, supra.
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explain does not render the ordinances unconstitutional.
The cruising ordinances are narrowly tailored to deal with the
unquestioned problems associated with cruising. The ordinances
are limited in time to those hours of the day where cruising was
shown to be a problem. They are limited to those streets where
the Municipalities experienced cruising. They set forth the
standards for cruising: three vehicular passes of a control point
within a two-hour period. There are also numerous exceptions for
vehicles operating with governmental or business purposes.
Thus, these cruising ordinances carefully carve out a narrow slice
of driving conduct for regulation. Scheunemann, ..., 507 N.W.2d
163. Given these limitations, we conclude that the Municipalities
have satisfactorily demonstrated that the cruising ordinances are
not unconstitutionally broad.
Brandmiller at 902.
Based on the information quoted above, it appears that the three cruising
ordinances of Brandmiller were very similar to the Salt Lake City ordinance, with the
exception of the greater time spans. And likewise, the Cruising ordinance before this
Court is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
3. The Cruising Ordinance Provides Sufficient Standards to Avoid an
Unbridled Delegation of Legislative Authority to Police.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a legislative enactment must
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. A determination must be
made as to whether the ordinance "necessarily entrusts law-making to the moment-tomoment judgment of the policeman on his beat." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
358-359 (1983). One authority has stated the rule as follows:
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A delegation of power, even to a city agent, will be allowed only
where that power is administrative, executive, or ministerial in
nature; the law-making and policy-formulating powers must
remain in the City legislative body. Any delegation of power by
the city's legislative body must be accompanied with adequate
standards to guide the exercise of power by the agent or body to
whom that delegation is made. ... If adequate guidelines do not
accompany a delegation of authority, then the person or body to
whom this is delegated is left to formulate the necessary
standards and limitation—and much formulation is really a
law-making chore, not mere administration.
Reynolds, Osborne M., Jr., Local Government Law, West Publishing Co., St. Paul,
Minn. 1982, at 162. (Numbering deleted.)
In enacting the subject ordinance, the Salt Lake City Council was very careful
to set forth clear and precise standards for the exercise of police discretion.
Specific "no cruising zones" were identified by the City Council as being
"traffic congestion areas" where the problems identified in the Council's findings had
been found. The only variation from the Council's previously identified traffic
congestion areas are "mobile traffic control points" which may be established by an
officer of the rank of sergeant or higher creating a written plan describing: (1) the
location of the traffic control point; (2) the date, time and location of the traffic
control point; (3) any instructions given to the enforcement officers concerning the
traffic control point; (4) a brief statement outlining the problem(s) which resulted in
the choosing of the date, time and location of the temporary traffic congestion area;
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and (5) the location of the warning signs. Salt Lake City Code 12.12.090 §§B and F.
The case at hand did not involve such a mobile traffic control point.
When enforcing the Cruising ordinance at any traffic control point, the police
are granted no discretion in which vehicles are to be stopped and which drivers cited.
The exemptions to the application of the ordinance are set out specifically, including:
(1) any publicly owned vehicle while in the performance of public duties; (2) any
vehicle license for public transportation, including but not limited to, buses and
taxicabs; (3) any in-service emergency vehicle; and (4) any vehicle being driven by a
resident of the traffic congestion area, or any vehicle being driven within the traffic
congestion area for necessary commercial or medical reasons. Id. at §D.
The specifically and clearly delineated standards governing police action set
forth in the ordinance show that the City Council's delegation of discretion is carefully
limited and thus meets constitutional guidelines.
CONCLUSION
For the most part, Appellant's brief consists of declarations of the broadest
possible nature concerning his political beliefs and his own interpretations of the place
of federal and state constitutions in American law. Little authority or legal analysis
has been provided. Due to the inadequacy of the Appellant's briefing, the issues
before the court are too broad and too vague to merit further review or oral argument.
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The exercise of police powers by Salt Lake City's legislative body to address
the concerns of public health, safety, and welfare by enacting the Cruising ordinance
was consistent with the general grant of power contained in Utah Code § 10-8-84 and
other enabling statutes. That ordinance was enacted as an infraction-level offense, and
therefore Appellant was not entitled to a jury trial.
Appellant has provided little or no analysis in his brief, let alone an analysis
that meets his burden of overcoming the presumption of validity and constitutionality
that is properly accorded to municipal ordinances. His reference to the Tenth
Amendment is misplaced, as that amendment is a restriction on federal power. His
reference to freedom of expression is completely unsubstantiated. With regard to his
assertions regarding the free exercise of religion, again, Appellant's bald assertions
that cruising could be religious to someone are not sufficient to merit appellate review.
Similarly, Appellant has not met his burden in asserting a violation of the Equal
Protection clauses.
Appellant claims further that the Cruising ordinance violates unenumerated
rights of the United States Constitution. As several appellate courts have found in
other jurisdictions, however, the right of intrastate travel is subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions. Salt Lake City's Cruising ordinance is a narrowly
tailored ordinance that satisfies all constitutional concerns.
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Appellee is confident that, should this Court decide to consider the
"arguments" of Appellant's brief, it will find that the Cruising ordinance will
withstand all constitutional challenges. Therefore, Appellee respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the conviction in this matter without oral argument.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £

day of June, 2000.

Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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Statutes and rules cited in this brief
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Salt Lake City Code
1.12.50 Violation-Penalty
Any person convicted of violating any provision of the ordinances codified in
this code, or ordinances hereafter enacted, shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor
unless otherwise specified in such ordinance, or interpreted by the court as a Class C
misdemeanor or infraction, and shall be punished as follows:
A.

In the case of a Class B misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum not

exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for a term not longer than six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment;
B.

In the case of a Class C misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum not

exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for a term not longer than ninety
days, or by both such fine and imprisonment;
C.

In the case of an infraction, by a fine in any sum not exceeding five

hundred dollars;
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Salt Lake City Code
12.12.090 Cruising
A.

Findings:

1. The Salt Lake City Council, after hearing, makes the following legislative
findings:
a. Cruising has created a traffic problem on various City streets by causing a
steady stream of vehicles to be unable to clear intersections, thus blocking traffic. The
traffic blocking is most noticeable downtown on the east-west bound traffic as they
are blocked by the north-south traffic stopped in intersections. It is also noticeable on
the north-south traffic in the Sugar House area, as vehicles heading north or south are
unable to move through intersections due to traffic on 2100 South.
b. The blocked traffic has contributed to motorist frustration and resultant
dangerous driving to either avoid the gridlock or dangerous maneuvers around the
blocked intersections.
c. Emergency vehicles have difficulty maneuvering through the blocked
intersections and traveling along the roads choked with traffic.
d. Traffic along City streets has increased forty percent (40%) since 1997, and
accidents have more than doubled.
e. The traffic creates noise of automobiles, horns, engines, screeching tires,
etc., that disrupts residents' quiet enjoyment of night.
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued
f. Motorist frustration has resulted in some violent episodes commonly called
"road rage".
g. In addition to the road rage that exists among the general population, gang
members express their frustration and flash gang signs challenging everyone around.
Other gang members pick up on the signs and flash their own challenges. Such
confrontations have resulted in two (2) homicides in the downtown area since
August 1997.
h. In addition, there are numerous fights, assaults with deadly weapons, and
other physical confrontations, which have resulted from heavy traffic congestion and
short tempers. The statistics for State Street are:
1997

1998

Homicides
Assaults
Public peace and order

1
402
1,520

1
525
1,455

Total

1,923

1,981

i. Statistics show that the calls for police in the downtown area peak during the
hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and through four o'clock (4:00) A.M. each night.
These calls for service, in part, are caused by cruising and the problems of gridlock,
violations of laws and improper driving caused by cruising.
j . Statistics show that the highest demand for police service caused by gridlock,
challenges to others and improper driving peak during Friday and Saturday nights.
54
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued
k. The majority of businesses in Sugar House and downtown areas are closed
or are closing by eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M., and very few are open after twelve
o'clock (12:00) midnight. Thus there is little business reason for traffic congestion
from eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. to four o'clock (4:00) A.M. Those businesses, which
have large populations leaving, such as events at the Delta Center and Symphony Hall
contribute to traffic congestion, but the persons attending have no reason to, and in
large part do not "cruise the area" as "cruising" is defined in this Section.
1. Commercial parking is available in the traffic congested areas of Sugar
House and downtown. Because of the availability of commercial parking, persons,
during the hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. to four o'clock (4:00) A.M. have little
need to "cruise the area" looking for public parking stalls.
m. Elimination of those who "cruise the streets" simply as "something to do"
will eliminate the vast majority of traffic congestion, noise associated with
automobiles, and the resultant dangerous driving and "road rage" during the target
hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M. in the downtown
and Sugar House areas.
n. Traffic accidents have increased Citywide since the fall of 1997. Many traffic
accidents occur which involve people cruising while drinking alcohol. Many
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued
drivers who are cruising are impaired as they consume alcohol or drugs while
involved in the gridlock.
B.

Definitions:

1. "Cruising" means the driving of a motor vehicle more than two (2) times
between the hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M., in a
particular direction, past a traffic-control point.
2. "Mobile traffic-control point" means at any point or points within the traffic
congested area established by the Police Department for the purpose of monitoring
violations of law.
3. "Traffic congestion area" shall mean any area designated and posted as a nocruising area in Schedule 5, set out in Chapter 12.104 of this Title, or any area
designated and posted as a temporary no-cruising area.
C.

Cruising Action Prohibited: No person shall drive or permit a motor

vehicle under his/her care, custody, or control to be driven in an area posted as a
traffic congested area past a traffic-control point in a particular direction more than
two (2) times between the hours of eleven o'clock (11:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00)
A.M.
D.

Exemptions: This Chapter shall not apply to:
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Salt Lake City Code, Cruising, 12.12.090, continued
1. Any publicly owned vehicle of any City, County, political subdivision, State,
or Federal agency while in the performance of public duties.
2. Any vehicle licensed for public transportation, including, but not limited to,
buses and taxicabs.
3. Any in-service emergency vehicle.
4. Any vehicle being driven by a resident of the traffic congestion area, or any
vehicle being driven within the traffic congestion area for necessary commercial or
medical reasons.
E.

Warning Signs Required:

1. Every no-cruising area shall be posted with sufficient signs to provide notice
of the prohibition.
2. Signs shall be of such size and shape, as the Transportation Engineer shall
deem appropriate in carrying out the Transportation Engineer's duties as set forth in
Sections 12.08.080 and 12.08.090 of this Title.
F.

Temporary No-Cruising Zones And Traffic-Control Points: Mobile

traffic-control point or points may be established by an officer of the rank of sergeant
or higher, creating a written plan describing: 1) the location of the traffic-control
point; 2) the date, time and location of the traffic-control point; 3) any instructions
given to the enforcement officers concerning the traffic-control point; 4) a brief
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statement outlining the problem(s) which resulted in the choosing of the date,
time and location of the temporary traffic congestion area; and 5) the location of the
warning signs.
(Ord. 40-99 §§ 1,2,1999)
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Utah Code Annotated
§ 10-8-30

Traffic regulations.

They may regulate the movement of traffic on the streets, sidewalks and public
places, including the movement of pedestrians as well as of vehicles, and the cars and
engines of railroads, street railroads and tramways, and may prevent racing and
immoderate driving or riding.

§ 10-8-60

Nuisances.

They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose
fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
§ 10-8-69

Annoying pastimes in streets.

They may prohibit or regulate the rolling of hoops, playing of ball, flying of
kites, riding of bicycles or tricycles, or any other amusements or practices having a
tendency to annoy persons passing in the streets or on sidewalks, or to frighten teams
of horses, or to interfere with traffic.
§ 10-8- 76

Noise abatement-Street performances.

They may prevent the ringing of bells, blowing of horns and bugles, crying of
goods by auctioneers and others, and the making of other noises, for the purpose of
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business, amusement or otherwise, and prevent all performances and devices tending
to the collection of persons on the streets or sidewalks of the city.
§ 10-8-84

Ordinances, rules, and regulations - Passage - Penalties.

They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not
repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and
duties conferred by this chapter, and as are necessary and proper to provide for the
safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace
and good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the
protection of property in the city; and may enforce obedience to the ordinances with
fines or penalties as they may deem proper, but the punishment of any offense shall be
by fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301
or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment.
§ 76-3-205

Infraction conviction - Fine, forfeiture, and disqualification.

(1) A person convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned but may be
subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination.
(2) Whenever a person is convicted of an infraction and no punishment is
specified, the person may be fined as for a class C misdemeanor.
§ 76-3-301

Fines of persons.

(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not exceeding:
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(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or second degree;
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction;
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction;
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute.
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership,
government, or governmental instrumentality.
§ 77-17-10 Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of fact by the jury.
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court.

61

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 9(a)
(a) Time for filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or a
petition for review is filed, the appellant, cross-appellant, or petitioner shall file a
docketing statement with the clerk of the appellate court. An original and two copies
of the docketing statement shall be filed with the court.
Rule 11(a), (e)(l)-(2)
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed
in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk
of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all
cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the
original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers
prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.

(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to
appellee ifpartial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice
of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such
parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems necessary. The
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request shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of
an appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
and the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within
the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested,
within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk
of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court
nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the
relevant portions of the transcript.

Rule 24(a)(9)
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: ...
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
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parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding.
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Constitution of the United States
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
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Amendment XIV, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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